Why Russia Invaded: History, Geopolitics, and Realities of the War in Ukraine
edited by Dae-Han Song (ISC Networking Team)
The chain of events that led to today’s current conflict in Ukraine are directly connected to the 2014 Euromaidan protests. In 2013, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych rejected a pending free trade agreement with the EU (the EU association agreement) choosing to pursue closer relations with Russia instead. This sparked protests and occupation of Kyiv’s Independence Square that spread to Ukraine’s other western provinces. These protests would later become known as Euromaidan. In the more pro-Russian eastern parts of Ukraine, Euromaidan sparked Anti-Maidan protests. The situation escalated into a military conflict between pro-separatist groups along with Russian support on the one side and the Ukrainian government on the other. As a result of this protracted conflict, Crimea has been annexed by Russia and the eastern part of the mining Donbass region is being controlled by pro-Russian forces. In 2021, despite Russia’s insistence that it will not invade, its troop movements towards the Ukraine border have re-ignited fears of a potential invasion. From the Russian side, they have stated that their actions are a response to the possible expansion of NATO into Ukraine, which would put NATO right up against Russian borders. On Feb. 22nd, Russian troops entered into the pro-Russia separatist dominated Eastern Ukraine. The situation has escalated into today’s war.
To explore the history of Ukraine during the Soviet period as well as the geopolitical forces, dynamics, and calculus at play that are shaping the current conflict, the ISC invited Dr. Harun Yilmaz to our monthly online Progressive Forum on “Ukraine at War: from the Soviet Union, to Euromaidan, to the Current Crisis.” Dr. Harun Yilmaz is a research fellow at Harvard University and the British Academy lecturer at Queen Mary University and writer on Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The interview has been edited for brevity and clarity.
International Strategy Center (ISC): Before diving into the conflict today, I want to take a step back and examine Ukraine’s historical relationship with Russia. When the Russian army entered Eastern Ukraine, Putin gave a televised speech criticizing Bolshevik policies for giving up historically Russian lands to Ukraine and dismissed Ukrainian national identity as the product of Bolshevik policies. Perhaps, it’s helpful to delineate three periods in Russian modern history: the Tsarist Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and today’s Russian Federation. During Tsarist Russia, most non-Russian nationalities were colonies of Russia. However, this shifted with the rise of the Bolsheviks that mobilized these non-Russian nationalities against the White Army, made up of Russians and Cossacks. The role that the Soviet Union played in the development of these modern national identities in its Soviet Republics is often ignored. In other interviews, you’ve mentioned that the Bolsheviks recognized and encouraged national identity formation by preserving cultures and languages. Beyond that, the Bolsheviks recognized national state boundaries not based on economic interests but based on national territorial realities. In that regard, we should distinguish between the relationship of today’s Russia with these nationalities with their relationship during Soviet times. So I guess I come to the question, can you talk a little bit about the historical emergence of Ukraine as a distinct nation and national identity during the Russian Empire and into the early USSR?
Dr. Harun Yilmaz (Yilmaz): Sure, thank you. We have, of course, Ukraine on maps for a very long time as a toponym like a geographic territory even since the Middle Ages. As you mentioned, Bolsheviks acknowledged national identities. They acknowledged national identities, but they didn't like nationalism. Because they were internationalists. They wanted to support the cultural aspects, but they didn't want these identities to turn into a politically mobilizing force. In a one party state, an alternative discourse or ideology would be a challenge against them. So sometimes, they accelerated support of national identities. Sometimes, they stepped back and put limitations. During these policy changes, many people were purged and even killed. On top of that, millions of Ukrainians died in the Great Famine in 1932. This was an artificial famine caused by a mixture of factors. However, the major problems were the errors made by Moscow’s political leadership led by Stalin. While the famine didn’t just hit Ukraine, but also Russia, and Kazakhstan, millions of Ukrainians still died of hunger.
The Second World War was another disaster for Ukraine. Nearly all cities, towns and villages were ruined. At first, the front moved from west to east, and then from east to west when the Red Army pushed back the Nazi German occupation. Each time there was destruction. When the Germans retreated, they tried to demolish and destroy everything. So, between 1945 and 1955, we saw a very rapid reconstruction of the country.
우크라이나 소비에트 사회주의공화국은 주로 소농 경제였지만 1951년 소련 최초의 컴퓨터를 개발할만큼 발전되었다.(사진 출처: Ukie Daily)
On the other hand, the Second World War was a period where different parts of Ukraine were brought together under the red flag. So we have Soviet Ukraine. And then in the interwar period, we had Polish Ukraine, Western Ukraine. These two territories were united. And then a small section of Romania called Northern Bukovina. That was also added to Soviet Ukraine. And then there's Transcarpathia which was a part of Czechoslovakia during the interwar period. And then, when Nazi Germany ruled the whole continent, the Nazis gave that part to their Hungarian allies. At the end of the war, that was passed again to Soviet Ukraine. All these parts were united under the Soviet flag. After 1991, they constituted parts of Ukraine as a nation-state. Obviously, in 1945, the Soviet leadership was not preparing a gift for the future nation state. But in practice, all these different territories became a single unit. In the 1950s, the Crimean peninsula was given from the Russian Soviet Federation to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. So, that’s how we have the modern borders of Ukraine.
Photo Source: Britannica Encyclopedia
Ukraine benefited and suffered from Soviet rule. There was a nation building policy, recognition of national identities and nation building policies in the Soviet Union and in Ukraine. At the same time, during the Great Famine, millions perished. In addition, there was one party rule and suppression of those that supported different political ideas. I would say this would be a more or less complete and balanced picture.
ISC: So, just to summarize, and please correct me if I'm wrong. During the Soviet period, there was a recognition of national identities. However, this was part of a larger strategy to create a sort of internationalism. Could you, perhaps, say encourage national cooperation? In other words, national identities were recognized as a way of creating greater cooperation and solidarity among those national identities?
Yilmaz: We could say that the Bolshevik Party leadership had a certain attitude towards national identities. They were internationalists. However, they understood the power of nationalism and national identities. They recognized the power of nationalism when the left couldn’t turn the First World War into civil wars. At that time, the French Socialist Party leader said, "If we say that this is a war between capitalist powers, and we shouldn't go to the front, but we should go and topple, remove the French government, then the French workers will come and beat us or kill us, so we cannot say that.” At that time, most of the Bolshevik leadership was in Europe (e.g. Lenin was in Switzerland), and they observed the strength of nationalism. After the Civil War, when the Bolsheviks gained power, they were confronted with emerging identities, modern identities. However, this was not full fledged nationalism, because what they inherited were still countries where 80-90% of the population were illiterate peasants living in semi isolated villages. The Bolsheviks recognized ignoring or suppressing nationalism or national identities would simply strengthen it and split the working class.
On top of that, they needed to rebuild a country to surpass its capitalist rivals. Imagine inheriting a country where various groups (e.g. Armenians and Muslim in the Caucasus) had previously attacked and killed each other. How can you then build an electric hydroelectric dam or irrigation canals or a textile factory that required an Armenian engineer, an Azerbaijani factory manager, and a Georgian railway engineer? How can they come together and work together if there was such antagonism? So, building a functioning economy and political structure required a peaceful atmosphere and innovative appeasement.
The Bolsheviks saw nationalists, national identities, as a car without brakes. How can you stop such a car? They thought that if they accelerated the car, then it would run out of fuel and eventually stop: national identities were a temporary historical phenomenon that had started parallel to capitalist economic relations and would also end. And all the differences, all the national cultures would emerge in human humanity, human culture, which would become “Soviet” culture.
ISC: Thank you. Very fascinating. Given Putin's public criticism of the Soviet political project for these non-Russian nationalities, how would you characterize Putin's vision of Russia and its surrounding countries today?
Yilmaz: Now, this is also linked to what happened later in the Soviet Union. So within the Soviet structure, the Russian national identity started to hijack the internationalist program. So it became more and more dominant. There are reasons behind that, but in one word, Russian national identity became more and more dominant in the Soviet discourse. It, in a way, hijacked this internationalist program. And at the same time, other national identities also consolidated themselves. So that by the 1970s and 80s, there was competition, which contributed to the Soviet collapse. Things didn't work as planned in theory.
By the 1990s, we had different nation-states, which continued to build national discourse and identity inherited from the Soviet period. Now in Russia, the ideology is very much Russian nationalist and state centered like in the other Soviet republics. The problem is that most of the ex-Soviet republics have no political movements or ideologies to counterbalance this nationalist discourse. In the political spectrum of Britain, France, Germany, there is nationalism, but there is also a more internationalist approach. There's something that counterbalances that right. In the former Soviet republics, we don't have that. One of the bad or sad legacies of the Bolshevik group was the destruction of the modern internationalist socialist movement. Today, the Russian Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which claims to represent the center left, is nationalistic.
ISC: So, what is Putin’s vision of Russia and the surrounding countries such as Ukraine?
Yilmaz: In terms of foreign policy or security policy, Russian leadership considers addressing territories to Russia as buffer zones. For them, they are extremely important for security reasons. So, this is an understanding of a huge land, land structure, you know, in the middle of Eurasia. Russia is not an island, an isolated country, with oceans to its left and right, like in the United States or Britain. This is a huge continental power. And they consider the adjacent territories as buffer zones.
ISC: You said that in these post-Soviet states, there is no ideology to counter this nationalism. Why is there no such ideology? Is that just because of the fall of the Soviet Union?
Yilmaz: The main reason is the Soviet period. There are certain negative aspects of the Soviet Union that all these countries inherited. The state and state apparatuses still dominate everything in this country. The absence of a left wing or internationalist movement is another unfortunate legacy of the Soviet period. Like, there are no strong labor unions. The Soviet period turned labor unions into bureaucratic Paper Tigers. The idea was that the workers are now in power. So, why do we need a separate labor union, which was inherited from the capitalist era. The labor unions ceased to function as we know them. Political parties ceased to exist as we know them, because there was only one party. After all, if this was the party of the people, why do we need a second party? Right? So that's why there is no strong overall traditional political party. The popularity of political parties has been a problem since 1991. And, the labor unions are weak. And, left wing politics is much weaker.
ISC: Would it be accurate to summarize that you're saying that the statism, the state-centered aspects, of the Soviet Union, left very little room for ideologies or parties to emerge and blossom in the post-Soviet period?
Yilmaz: I would also quickly add this. Another consequence of all these things is right wing discourse, especially sometimes extreme right wing discourse, with all its trimmings becomes more popular. We actually see this in Germany. German nationalism is stronger in former Eastern Germany than in Western Germany. Something very similar is going on there as well.
ISC: In the past, Putin has been characterized as a cost effective strategist. Many of us in the left believed that he would not invade Ukraine because he did not want another Afghanistan, where Russia is mired in a protracted war for a long time, especially given the strong Ukrainian resistance towards it. But clearly, that has changed. If Putin had in fact been a cost-effective strategist, why did he change?
Yilmaz: You're totally right. Not only me, but many experts, not only in the left but also in the right, especially representatives of a realist approach, also thought that Putin was a clever strategist. He was not after adventures. He made careful cost benefit analysis and acted when the risks were low. However, in the Ukrainian case, he didn't follow this cost efficient path. He could have supported the separatists as he did before or pressured Kyiv for the implementation of Minsk II. Today, his recklessness reminds us of American military adventures. Perhaps, we can find an ideological reason. Perhaps, Russian nationalism encouraged him to take costly steps. During his one hour history lecture, Putin sounded more like Putin the Russian nationalist than Putin the strategist. He didn't recognize modern Ukraine as a separate nation state. And, as a typical nationalist would do, he picked convenient episodes from a century ago to justify his coercive policies in Ukraine. So, in one word, Putin the Russian nationalist has swallowed Putin the strategist. That's how I see it. One might argue that he thought the cost of waiting further and playing as a strategist would have more risks. Perhaps, that's the analysis he had in mind. But, behind that analysis, there is the approach of a nationalist, not a strategist.
ISC: A lot of the Western media is portraying the military action as an unprovoked aggression. This is very similar to media discourse around North Korea. When there’s a flare-up or aggression by states opposed to US hegemony, they are often presented without any context as simply irrational or unprovoked. Attempts to offer an alternative analysis trying to understand these actions as part of a rational geopolitical calculus are often portrayed as being overly sympathetic to North Korea or in the current case being pro-Russian or denying Ukrainian sovereignty. However, what is rarely mentioned is the US role in instigating or escalating these conflicts. It seems that this switch from Putin the cost effective strategist to Putin the nationalist can’t be divorced from the very long time that there has been NATO expansion towards Russia. What would you say is the role of the US in the current crisis today?
Yilmaz: Actually, that's a very important point you made because this is, of course, we are talking about a great power rivalry here. And I'm not the first one who obviously mentioned this. Professor John Mearsheimer of Chicago University mentioned that great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. For instance, the US does not tolerate a distant great power, deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. As you know, that's the Monroe Doctrine since the 19th century. So, the American approach to Ukraine is like Chinese forces in Canada or Mexico. Russian leaders have told their western counterparts many times that NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine is unacceptable. In addition, in 2008, Russia sent a message with the Russian-Georgian war. At that time, Georgian President Saakashvili felt more confident after their membership to NATO opened in 2008. And, I guess he had some military units trained by Western Army officers. He thought he could take back a separatist region under Russian protection in South Ossetia. But, it didn't work like that. The Russians sent troops to support the separatists and push the Georgians back to proper Georgia. This all happened in 2008.
Photo Source: Dcinside.com
Even the prominent US diplomat George Kennan, who authored the post Second World War American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, warned, in 1998, that NATO expansion was not a good idea. Russians would "gradually react quite adversely, and it will affect their policies." It was a strategic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.
Now, there is an interesting dynamic in NATO expansion. We, of course, also have the agency of the countries between NATO and Russia. Most of these countries historically felt a threat from the east. And that's why their elites (in Poland, or Czech Republic, etc) wanted to be part of the NATO security structure. So there is also that local agency there. It's not only about two big powers.
However, when the expansion came closer and closer to the Russian border, that of course increased the tension. And so if American policy played a role that would be opening the door of NATO to Georgia and Ukraine. If we had a time machine and went back to 1991, and defined Ukraine, Belarus as neutral states, as happened with Finland and Austria, we wouldn't be experiencing many issues we are experiencing now. But that's, of course, a missed opportunity. Now, we have a completely different reality and dynamics.
So basically, Ukraine was not a core US strategic interest, but the US encouraged NATO membership, and encouraged the Ukrainian side to not make any compromises towards Russia. And this of course increased the tension. I mean, there are more, of course, details since 2014; many things happened. But overall, I think that's the American contribution to the increasing tensions.
ISC: So the Minsk Peace Accords attempted to resolve the conflict in Donbass by, amongst other things, giving greater autonomy to the Russian speaking regions. Some observers have argued that because Minsk would have given eastern Ukrainian regions veto power over joining the EU or NATO, the Ukrainian government and their Western allies frustrated the Minsk Accords. So, when Putin recently declared eastern regions to be -- not just autonomous, but independent -- he effectively rejected what remained of Minsk. Can you elaborate on why the Minsk accords failed and do you see a viable alternative path forward?
Yilmaz: Well, you're right. The Minsk II agreement could have been an alternative scenario. But given Ukrainian domestic politics, it would have been difficult to follow and implement. The Ukraine side signed this agreement, because they understood that they couldn’t follow an alternative policy at the time because of the military operations in eastern Ukraine. They thought: we will sign it now and gain some time; when we get stronger, we can perhaps push for another deal, revise this. And the Europeans or Americans also didn’t encourage Kyiv to implement these things. From the Russian perspective, this was a good deal. And that's why the Russian side waited for its implementation for the past 6-7 years. If perhaps, if we had a pro-Russian government in Ukraine more inclined to implement the Minsk agreements, then probably they would have done it.
Image Source: International Business Times
ISC: How do you see the current situation playing out?
Yilmaz: Well, there are many unknowns like how the war will evolve. But, most probably, whatever the outcome of this war, Russia will be weaker. If the Russian army is stuck in Ukraine, and they cannot achieve their goals as fast as they planned, war might trigger changes within Russia. This depends on the impact of the economic crisis. If you look at Russian history, system change usually came after military difficulties like the Crimean War in 1856 and the Russo Japanese war in 1905. After the Crimean War, we didn’t have revolution, but we did get the emancipation of serfs. During the first World War, we had a revolution in 1917. And one might argue that the situation of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s contributed to the political changes under Gorbachev.
Regardless of whether Putin gains his objective, in the end, Russia will be weaker and isolated. Ukraine will also be weaker because of the destruction. The war in Ukraine might be the first European or global crisis where the Chinese great power enters as a game changer.
Beijing is following a careful diplomacy. Washington, of course, is trying to divert Beijing from its tightrope walk, which might be working since there are indications that China is withdrawing its support of Russia. From what we see in the media and from leaked documents, a picture is emerging of Americans demanding Chinese involvement. That's a tacit acknowledgement of China's rising power in global politics. In international relations, a stable balance of power is necessary for peace among conflicting powers. There's a power rivalry here. And China might emerge stronger after the crisis by guaranteeing a certain balance. So the West needs China to control a declining revisionist Russia. And, I think Putin listens to Xi Jingping more than anyone else. Ultimately, Russia will end up weaker and more dependent on China regardless of the final outcome in Ukraine. So after this war, China will have more say on what the world order looks like.
ISC: Any final remarks?
Yilmaz: Well, the only thing I would probably say is that this war, this conflict is madness because no one will win. There is no winner in this, neither the Russians, Ukrainians, or Europeans. No one will win anything from that. It's a very destructive and reactionary war, if there is anything like that. There is no benefit. There is no good. No good will come out of it.